| Work Detail |
Provision 24/2025 , recently issued by the national government, modifies the qualification and registration system for construction companies with the aim of facilitating the participation of new bidders in tenders and eliminating bureaucratic barriers. The initiative seeks to correct historical distortions in the national public works system, promoting greater competition and reducing cartelization. However, this measure—although valued for its openness— does not address a structural problem : the growing process of provincialization and municipalization of public works in Argentina. In practice, with severe budgetary restrictions at the national level, large-scale projects are limited , while provinces and municipalities increasingly assume responsibility for road, water, education, and urban projects . This phenomenon, already observed in concrete examples such as the bridge between Santo Tomé and Santa Fe , historically national but built by the province, highlights a fragmented reality . While the National Public Works Law No. 13,064 established a single business registry, today there are more than 20 provincial registries and nearly 2,000 municipal regulations governing contracting and construction conditions. The abolished National Registry only resolved part of this complex issue. To participate in tenders, construction companies must register and comply with specific requirements in each jurisdiction , which entails tax adjustments, social security, local licensing, and professional registration in each province . This system imposes high administrative costs and hampers the expansion of firms that operate in multiple districts , creating a fragmented market that often benefits companies with local or regional ties . Furthermore, it is noted that cartelization in public works is not only a result of the registration regime , but also of opaque practices by contracting governments , such as non-payment or the arbitrary allocation of contracts. In this context, the association between construction companies—and, in some cases, with political sectors—responded to a logic of economic survival and the spurious exchange of favors , rather than to rules imposed by the registries. In this scenario, Provision 24/2025 resolves a formal aspect at the national level , but does not address the root of the problem: the regulatory dispersion and political dynamics that turn public works into an instrument of territorial power . It is anticipated that in the short term, provinces will deepen their own contracting regimes , favoring local companies and workers, as a way to stimulate their economies and reduce unemployment. Thus, the fragmentation of the system will increase, and public works in Argentina will tend to become feudalized, operating under different rules, criteria, and priorities in each province or municipality. This will require companies to make increasing efforts to adapt and invest to remain competitive in this new decentralized landscape. Thats why we recommend that companies target their sales channels in the provinces and have a potential partner in each one so they can participate in a temporary partnership with a local company with political power. |
